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INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) has raised the stakes for financial regulation by requiring
more than twenty federal agencies to promulgate nearly 400 new rules.'
Scholars, regulated entities, Congress, courts, and the agencies themselves
have all recognized-even before Dodd-Frank-the lack of rigorous cost-
benefit analysis in the context of financial rulemaking.2 The D.C. Circuit
has struck down several financial regulations because of inadequate cost-
* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Professor of Law, respectively, Michael E.
Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S. Code); see Deconstructing Dodd-Frank, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/11 /business/Deconstructing-Dodd-Frank.html
(citing law firm report that 398 rules are required by Dodd-Frank).
2. See, e.g., PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS.
COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 6-11 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2231314. To be sure, the relevant parties do not agree that independent agencies
are legally required to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis, as such agencies are not sub-
ject to the executive orders requiring cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the D.C. Circuit has held
that the Administrative Procedure Act and agencies' governing statutes require them to con-
sider costs and benefits. See id. at 6-9, 24-36; see also cases cited infra note 3. In March
2012, the SEC responded to criticisms about inadequate cost-benefit analysis by issuing a
guidance memorandum that in effect embraces the executive's cost-benefit analysis frame-
work while maintaining that "[n]o statute expressly requires the Commission to conduct a
formal cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking activities." Memorandum from the SEC
Div. of Risk, Strategy, & Fin. Innovation and the SEC Office of the Gen. Counsel to the
Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices 3-4 (Mar. 16, 2012), available at
http: //www. sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfiguidance-econ-analy secrulemaking.pdf; see also
ROSE & WALKER, supra, at 34-36 (comparing SEC and executive agency approaches).
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benefit analysis, with three more challenges to be decided this summer.3
Members of Congress have introduced legislation to address this problem,
including a call for the President to intervene to require more exacting eco-
nomic analysis.4 Regulated entities and investor protection groups are vig-
orously debating whether (and how) financial regulators should engage in
cost-benefit analysis, as are a variety of policymakers, academics, and
commentators.
Absent from these debates, however, is a serious discussion of the
importance of cost-benefit analysis in promoting good governance and
democratic accountability. This Essay seeks to fill that void. The lack of
attention to accountability is particularly troubling in the Dodd-Frank con-
text, where most regulators are independent agencies and thus less demo-
cratically accountable via presidential oversight. In particular, independent
agencies are not required to submit proposed rules and accompanying eco-
nomic analyses for presidential review. Nor are their high-ranking officials
subject to plenary presidential removal authority. Without another means of
accountability- e.g., a robust cost-benefit analysis embedded in notice-and-
comment rulemaking-independent agencies are more vulnerable to agency
capture.
This Essay argues that Dodd-Frank regulators should consider more
seriously the democratic accountability concerns at play when regulating
the financial markets. And those who regulate the regulators (via statutory
command, executive order, or judicial review) should pay more attention to
the good governance rationales for cost-benefit analysis when deciding
3. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking
down proxy access rule because the SEC "inconsistently and opportunistically framed the
costs and benefits of the rule"); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167-68
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (striking down fixed indexed annuities rule because "the SEC failed to
properly consider the effect of the rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation");
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (striking down mutual
fund board independence rule because the SEC "violate[d] the APA by failing adequately to
consider the costs mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the conditions" it
adopted). As alluded to above, there are also three pending cases that challenge the adequacy
of the financial regulators' cost-benefit analysis. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-
1398 (D.C. Cir. argued Mar. 22, 2013) (challenging extractive industries rule); Investment
Co. Inst. v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 12-5413 (D.C. Cir. to be argued
May 6, 2013) (challenging investment companies oversight rule); Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. to be argued May 15, 2013) (challenging conflict minerals
rule).
4. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012)
(proposing legislation "[t]o affirm the authority of the President to require independent regu-
latory agencies to comply with regulatory analysis requirements applicable to executive
agencies"); see also Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong.
(2011), reintroduced as S. 450, 113th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2013); SEC Regulatory Accountability




whether and how to encourage Dodd-Frank regulators to engage in more
rigorous and transparent economic analysis.
TRADITIONAL RATIONALES FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
For over three decades -under both Democratic and Republican admin-
istrations-cost-benefit analysis has been a fundamental regulatory tool in
the modern administrative state. Over the years, Congress and various Pres-
idents have taken a number of steps to require federal agencies to engage in
cost-benefit analysis when deciding how to regulate. Cost-benefit analysis,
as developed by the last five Presidents, instructs that an agency should
"adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of
the intended regulation justify its costs" and should "tailor its regulations to
impose the least burden on society."5 The traditional rationales for cost-
benefit analysis have focused on promoting more rational regulatory
decisionmaking and thus more efficient regulation.
Cost-benefit analysis furthers these interests in a number of ways. First,
it assists in ensuring that regulatory efforts produce a net positive effect on
society, which should be a fundamental goal of all regulation. Choosing
whether and how to regulate is generally a question of evaluating tradeoffs.
Cost-benefit analysis requires an agency to consider the various economic
effects of a particular regulation as opposed to possible alternatives, includ-
ing the alternative of no regulation at all.
Moreover, cost-benefit analysis reduces the risk of unintended conse-
quences by forcing the agency to consider all costs and benefits as well as
the range of regulatory alternatives. Regulators systematically overestimate
the likelihood of events that come easily to mind-especially recent, high-
profile events where regulation failed; indeed, Dodd-Frank is what Larry
Ribstein would characterize as a "bubble law" that is particularly suscepti-
ble to overestimation of risk.6 Cost-benefit analysis forces the agency to
focus not only on preventing a future catastrophe but also on any other con-
sequences of the proposed regulation. In so doing, the agency forces itself
5. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); accord Exec. Order
No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites /default/files /omb/assets /omb/circulars/a004/ a-4.pdf. See generally Peter M. Shane, Po-
litical Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review
of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 176-78 (1995) (comparing Reagan and Clinton execu-
tive orders imposing cost-benefit analysis on executive agencies).
6. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 78-79 (2003); see also,
e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 22-26
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
STAN. L. REV. 247, 261-62 (1996). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of
Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated,
97 CORNELLL. REV. 1019, 1025-26 (2012) (criticizing bubble law theory).
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to quantify risks and thus reduces the likelihood that cognitive biases nega-
tively affect regulatory efforts.
Finally, cost-benefit analysis encourages regulators to properly allocate
limited resources. Regulators must not merely ensure that regulatory bene-
fits justify the costs; they must make the most efficient use of scarce
resources. If an agency can produce comparable outcomes in multiple ways,
it should choose the one that imposes the smallest net cost to society, and to
the agency itself. Without some form of cost-benefit analysis, the agency
has no grounds to make such a judgment. In sum, by requiring regulators to
account for the anticipated costs and benefits of proposed regulations, cost-
benefit analysis increases the likelihood that rules will take into account all
relevant considerations, produce net positive outcomes, avoid unintended
consequences, be more cost-effective than comparable alternatives, and dis-
tribute resources efficiently.
Criticisms of cost-benefit analysis have similarly focused on efficiency
and rational decisionmaking. Some critics have challenged the method' s
ability to accurately calculate costs and benefits as well as the regulators'
expertise to make such calculations. In the financial markets context, critics
have renewed longstanding arguments that cost-benefit analysis is unneces-
sarily costly and time-consuming. There are, of course, also well-traversed
ethical and moral critiques of cost-benefit analysis.7 Others have objected to
cost-benefit analysis on decisionmaking grounds because it "closes off
opportunities for public debate, and substitutes control by a new breed of
'experts' who subtly manipulate the evaluation so that it conforms to the
procedures of the market-place."
We have explored these criticisms elsewhere and concluded that many
arguments against cost-benefit analysis developed in other contexts do not
apply with equal force (if at all) in the context of financial regulation.9 For
instance, whatever the value of ethical arguments against the use of cost-
benefit analysis in the context of environmental, safety, or other regulations,
7. For efficiency criticisms generally, see, for example, Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor
Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEo. L.J. 2341, 2344-45 (2002) (discussing "daunting scientific
uncertainties" in cost-benefit analysis). For efficiency criticisms specific to financial regula-
tion, see, for example, BETTER MKTS., SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND FINANCIAL REFORM AT THE SEC 36-38 (2012), available at
http: //www.bettermarkets.com/ sites /default/files /Setting The Record Straight.pdf. For ethical
and moral criticisms, see, for example, Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market
Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1317 (1986); Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2049 (1998); and
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 1005 (2000).
8. Robert C. Zinke, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Legitimation, 16 POL'Y
STUD. J. 63, 73 (1987) (quoting David Dickson et al., The Cost-Benefit Swindle Puts Dollar
Signs on Human Health, IN THESE TIMES, May 13-19, 1981, at 13, 13) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
9. See ROSE & WALKER, supra note 2, at 16-24.
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financial regulation is less likely to implicate thorny questions of placing a
value on human life or comparing tangible economic costs with less tangi-
ble environmental costs, such as the value of wildlife preserves or endan-
gered species. There will still be debates about how to quantify different
costs and benefits, but the costs and benefits at issue in financial regulation
are generally economic and thus quantifiable without having to engage in
valuing noneconomic osts or benefits.
GOOD GOVERNANCE RATIONALES FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Whereas the efficiency and rational decisionmaking arguments are front
and center in the debates about the use of cost-benefit analysis in financial
regulation, the good governance rationales are seldom seen or heard. Yet
they are similarly, if not more, important.
To appreciate the value of cost-benefit analysis in promoting good gov-
ernance, consider the nature of federal regulation: Article I of the Constitu-
tion provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress[,]"'o but in practice Congress delegates substantial rulemaking
authority to federal agencies. Unlike members of Congress, agency officials
are not elected. This means that citizens, who are bound by the force of law
of agency rules, neither directly select these administrators nor have the
power to directly vote them out of office. As the federal bureaucracy has
grown over time, the President has assumed oversight responsibility for
much agency rulemaking. Nonetheless, tension remains between the mod-
ern regulatory state and our democratic values.
Because federal agency officials wield considerable power but acquire
their positions by appointment rather than directly through the democratic
process, their regulations raise concerns of democratic legitimacy and
accountability. Cost-benefit analysis helps alleviate those concerns by mak-
ing agency decisionmaking more transparent o the public and to elected of-
ficials who can exercise control over the agencies. Among the stated goals
for the use of cost-benefit analysis by executive agencies is "to make the
[regulatory] process more accessible and open to the public."" Cost-benefit
analysis requires an agency to attempt to quantify its reasoning process-
revealing which aspects of a problem the agency has taken into account.
One can challenge the agency's calculations or even its choices about which
factors count in the decisionmaking process. "Armed with this information,
the well-disposed president can scold, threaten, or punish agencies that do
not produce welfare-maximizing regulations."1 2 Indeed, as Eric Posner has
maintained, "[t]he purpose of requiring agencies to perform cost-benefit
10. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
11. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
12. MATTHEw D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEw FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 111 (2006).
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analysis is not to ensure that regulations are efficient; it is to ensure that
elected officials maintain power over agency regulation."13
A second good governance value of cost-benefit analysis is that it lev-
erages the expertise of the regulators and, ideally, applies it in a neutral
fashion to a particular regulatory problem.14 Agencies do not begin rule-
making on a blank slate, surveying all of the possible solutions to a problem
and seeking to choose the best. They begin with a mandate from Congress
and, often, strong policy preferences from the President. But Congress does
not delegate rulemaking authority to agencies simply to allow the President
to shape the details of the statutory scheme, especially in the case of
independent agencies. Congress does so at least in part on the theory that
agencies will bring to bear technical expertise that Congress lacks.15
Cost-benefit analysis facilitates the exercise of this expertise by provid-
ing a framework that insulates the agencies from powerful political pres-
sures. One way it does so is by focusing on the objective effects of the regu-
lation. As financial markets and attendant regulatory interventions increase
in complexity, Dodd-Frank regulators' expertise-and the cost-benefit
analysis methodologies that leverage the exercise of this expertise-takes
on commensurately increasing importance.
AGENCY INDEPENDENCE AND CAPTURE
Cost-benefit analysis also furthers the important good governance aim
of avoiding agency capture by regulated parties. This objective is particu-
larly important in the independent agency context, where the President can-
not exert the same degree of control over agency decisionmaking.
Regulated parties can and should provide input into the development of
regulations. But the possibility exists that private actors-whether those
who are or will be subject to regulation, or others who stand to gain or lose
from particular regulatory action-will gain undue influence over the regu-
lators. Such agency capture can occur for many reasons, including the
revolving-door phenomenon whereby regulators anticipate aking or return-
ing to jobs in industry and fear alienating the entities they regulate. 16 In the
13. Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Politi-
cal Theory Perspective, 68 U. Cm. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2001); accord Eric A. Posner, Cost-
Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem, 53 ADnN. L. REV. 289, 291-92
(2001).
14. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680-81, 686-90 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Leg-
islative Delegation, 68 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 6-7 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Insti-
tutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REv. 15, 23 (2010); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713-14 (1975). See generally
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW To LIMIT IT
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financial regulation context, agencies face pressure not only from those they
regulate, but also from interest groups that represent the interests of inves-
tors and others who may benefit from, or be hurt by, a particular regulation.
And-though perhaps not the classic form of capture-there may be undue
pressure put on the agency by high-ranking agency officials with particular
policy agendas, or by the politicians who helped those officials obtain their
positions within the agency.
Cost-benefit analysis does not by itself prevent such influence. But,
when coupled with notice-and-comment rulemaking, the resulting transpar-
ency in agency decisionmaking should substantially disarm the threat of
agency capture. 17 Notice-and-comment cost-benefit analysis provides a sig-
nificant protection by requiring the agency to reveal the factors that underlie
its analysis. If interest group pressure has distorted the agency's calcula-
tions of costs and benefits, the analysis is likely to reflect such influence
and provide Congress, the President, the courts, and the public at large with
an opportunity to demand course correction. Moreover, such transparency
raises the cost of attempts at undue influence, as regulators should be less
willing to adopt less efficient positions if they know that the origin of those
positions will be revealed.
These protections against agency capture are particularly important in
the Dodd-Frank context, where most regulators are independent agencies
that are further removed from presidential control than traditional executive
agencies. For instance, the heads of independent agencies are not subject to
plenary presidential removal authority. And, unlike executive agencies,
their rulemaking processes are not subject to presidential oversight via
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Pres-
ident's Office of Management and Budget.' Instead, the ultimate defense
against independent agency capture is the public nature of the process itself,
with the threat of congressional (and perhaps judicial) oversight and correc-
tion.
In striking down an SEC rule for inadequate cost-benefit analysis, the
D.C. Circuit seems to have recognized this value, remarking that he agency
must "apprise itself-and hence the public and the Congress-of the eco-
nomic consequences of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to
(Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., forthcoming 2013), available at
http://www.tobinproject.org/books-papers/preventing-capture.
17. Cf. David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index
Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 81, 91 (2005) (explaining that transparency during notice-
and-comment rulemaking "makes it much more difficult for there to be agency capture").
18. See RoSE & WALKER, supra note 2, at 4-6; see also Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2331-32 (2001) (explaining that presidential over-
sight "establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the
latter's responsiveness to the former").
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adopt the measure."19 As Henry Manne has observed, cost-benefit analysis
in financial regulation serves the important democratic function of making
"the discussion of new regulations more open to truly informed community
comment as opposed to special-interest pleading" and assures the public
that "their comments will be examined by sensible and knowledgeable
experts and not bureaucrats interested mainly in the political implications of
a new proposal."2 0 Without conducting a robust cost-benefit analysis that is
made public and transparent via notice-and-comment rulemaking, defenses
against agency capture are undermined.
CONCLUSION
Despite decades-long bipartisan support for cost-benefit analysis, regu-
lators of financial markets (whose rulemaking is not subject to presidential
review) have been slower and more haphazard in adopting this method than
their executive agency counterparts. Especially now that Dodd-Frank has
exponentially increased the amount of financial rulemaking and considera-
bly raised the stakes for regulating the financial markets, financial regula-
tors can and should ground their rulemaking in a proper cost-benefit analy-
sis to arrive at more rational decisionmaking and more efficient regulation.
Conducting a rigorous cost-benefit analysis via notice-and-comment rule-
making also makes for good governance. Without such public transpar-
ency-especially in the context of independent agencies -democratic
accountability suffers, and agency capture becomes a greater threat.
For these reasons, the lack of attention to good governance in the cur-
rent debates about cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation is particu-
larly disconcerting. Dodd-Frank regulators must grapple with these
accountability issues themselves. If they do not (or continue to do so inade-
quately), Congress, the President, or even the courts should, and likely will,
intervene to encourage more exacting and transparent economic analysis.
As part of that intervention, these regulators of the regulators can and
should impose more democratic accountability over the independent agen-
cies Dodd-Frank has charged with the daunting task of regulating the finan-
cial markets.
19. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
20. Henry G. Manne, Economics and Financial Regulation: Will the SEC's New
Embrace of Cost-Benefit Analysis Be a Watershed Moment?, REGULATION, Summer 2012, at
20, 23.
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